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Neutrality and the Good of Religious
Freedom: An Appreciative Response
to Professor Koppelman
Richard W. Garnett*
I.
It is an honor and a pleasure to have this opportunity to comment on the
work of my friend and collaborator, Andy Koppelman.1 He has, despite
what he is quite comfortable telling me are my errors, been unfailingly
generous to me—as a mentor, a conversation partner, and a tough, but
constructive, critic. At a time when the work of the academy is often
corrupted by low and mean-spirited partisanship, and the commitments and
contributions of religious believers are regularly treated in universities with
condescension, or worse, Professor Koppelman is a model not only of
scholarly integrity, but also of broad-minded decency and fairness. Some
are content to write and fret about civility and dialogue, but Andy “walks the
walk,” understanding that—this side of Heaven, anyway—decent, intelligent
people often disagree, in good faith, about things that matter.
I was fortunate, in the spring of 2011, to read closely and “workshop,”
with a number of scholars,2 Professor Koppelman’s forthcoming book,3 on

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Notre Dame. I am grateful to Professor
Robert Cochran for his leadership and example, and for including me in the outstanding conference
that was the occasion for this short response. All of us who are interested in the study of law and
religion, and all of us who embrace (but also struggle with) the challenge of integrating the lawyer’s
vocation with religious faith, owe a debt of thanks to Professor Cochran. I also thank Professor
Andrew Koppelman for his friendship and for our many conversations, from which I have learned a
great deal, and Paul Horwitz, Steven Smith, Michael Perry, Nelson Tebbe, and Chad Flanders for
reading and improving this response. And, I appreciate very much the patience of Nicole Rodger
and her colleagues on the Pepperdine Law Review for their patience and assistance. This is a
response to Andrew Koppelman’s And I Don’t Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American
Law, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1115 (2013), and a part of Pepperdine University School of Law’s February
2012 conference entitled, The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence
Whom?
1. See FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012).
2. The workshop was organized by Professor Michael Perry and sponsored by The Center for
the Study of Law and Religion’s Roundtable on New Books in Morality, Religion, and Law.
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which his paper in this volume is based.4 And, I can confidently report that
the book is first-rate. Koppelman has synthesized—not merely collected and
packaged—years of work and dozens of projects, and produced a valuable
description, diagnosis, and evaluation of American case law, thinking, and
practice regarding religious freedom and church-state relations. Our views
and positions are not the same, but I admire his accomplishment.
In this brief response, I will highlight just a few aspects of Koppelman’s
argument and project that I think are especially strong and important. I will
also mention, without elaboration, a few places where we might part
company. And then, in keeping with the longstanding practice of
“respondents,” I will exploit my invitation and impose on readers an
argument—or perhaps just a suggestion—of my own.
II.
For starters, I appreciate Professor Koppelman’s reminder that, maybe,
things are not so bad. Yes, it is true that the Court often makes a mess of
things, certain Justices are prone to cringe-inducing displays of unwarranted
self-confidence, and the threats to religious freedom, at home and abroad,
are real. Still, we have, as Professor Koppelman notes, “been unusually
successful in dealing with religious diversity”5 and, despite the fair and
ample criticism directed at our First Amendment case law, it strikes me that
our courts—if not always our administrators and elected officials—are
“muddling through” reasonably well: Our judicial doctrines permit
reasonable cooperation—like school voucher programs—between
governments and religious institutions;6 they protect (with some exceptions)
private religious speech in public places7 and prohibit discriminatory
regulation of religious practices;8 they allow (even if they do not require)
exemptions and other accommodations for religious believers and
religiously motivated conduct;9 and—as was confirmed by unanimous
decision in the Hosanna-Tabor case—they recognize the freedom of
religious communities to decide religious questions for themselves.10

3. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY IN AMERICAN LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND
DEFENSE (forthcoming 2012).
4. See Andrew Koppelman, And I Don’t Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American
Law, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1115 (2013).
5. Id. at 1115–16.
6. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
10. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
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To be sure, things aren’t perfect. There are some aspects of our
religious freedom law that might make us roll or avert our eyes,11 and there
are troubling signs—or reminders, perhaps—that our governments and
regulators are tempted to regard religious liberty more as an inconvenience
than a fundamental human right. Nevertheless, I do think that Koppelman is
right: it could be worse, and there is no shame in being happy that it is not.
There are many other sound and welcome points, claims, and
observations in Koppelman’s paper (and in his book). He correctly criticizes
and refutes those “radical secularists” who regard religion as “toxic and
valueless” and who seem bent on its “eradication . . . from public life.”12 He
is right that the Constitution does permit—indeed, it invites—the
accommodation of religion. Such accommodation, in other words—such
special treatment of religion—does not violate the prohibition on religious
establishments and is, instead, in accord with what Justice Douglas was right
to call “the best of our traditions.”13 Koppelman helpfully amends John
Rawls’s call for “civic friendship” with the reminder that the “path to actual
civic friendship” is not, in the real world, aided by rules of engagement that
require the bracketing or translating of “comprehensive views”;14 the better
way, instead, is to “tell each other what we [really] think and talk about it.”15
He is wise to urge readers not to overstate or obsess over the difficulties
involved in “defining” religion because there is no single definition. Instead,
“[w]e know it when we see it.”16 And he is right that First Amendment
doctrine, to the extent it contains a judicially enforceable “secular purpose”
requirement, should focus on legislative outputs—that is, on what officials
actually do and say—rather than on inputs, including the supposed motives
of legislators or religious commitments of voters.17 After all, what matters is
not (or should not be) who supported a particular measure and why, but
whether the measure itself exceeds the power constitutionally granted to the
government or crosses a boundary constitutionally imposed on the exercise
of that power.18

11. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
12. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 1115–16.
13. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
14. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 1125–26.
15. Id. at 1133.
16. Id. at 1122.
17. Id. at 1133–36.
18. I realize that it is thought by many that the reasons why those (or some or many of those)
who supported a particular measure are highly relevant to the task of identifying such boundaries,
but I am suggesting here that they should not be.
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If only to better play the role of respondent, I should also admit that
some of Koppelman’s arguments strike me as incomplete, or less than
compelling. First, he accepts (even if he is reluctant to actually defend) what
appears to be the current Court’s settlement of the “ceremonial deism”
question, namely the “general rule . . . that old forms of deism are
grandfathered into constitutionality, but newer ones are unconstitutional.”19
According to this rule, the “old 1950s civil religion” is “immune from
further tinkering;” it is “secure . . . in a walled city, safe but trapped.”20 It is
not clear to me what is coherent—or, for that matter, “neutral”—about this
settlement (even if we think it is, on balance, attractively workable). Why is
the American “ideal of religious neutrality”21 unthreatened by an older Ten
Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas state capitol, but
vexed by a newer montage—which includes the Ten Commandments—on
the walls of a county courthouse?22
Koppelman’s view, it seems, is that the message sent—the “social
meaning” conveyed—in these two cases is different. The former display
represented and expressed a once-shared social consensus, and leaving it
alone simply leaves in place the status quo. However, “[n]ew sponsorship of
religious practices is far more likely to represent a contemporaneous effort to
intervene in a live religious controversy.”23 That is, the social meaning of
newer religious symbols and expression is more likely to be one of division,
conflict, and exclusion; older symbols, and their toleration, “say” something
different.
There is something to this. Given all the givens, the putting up of a Ten
Commandments display in a courthouse today probably communicates—and
is probably intended to communicate—something different than did the
perhaps unthinking and reflexive display of a similar monument sixty years
ago. It probably does represent, in a way that the older display did not, a
kind of “pushing back.” Still, it seems to me that—as is often the case in
law and policy debates when “neutrality” is invoked—there remains the
question of the baseline, and the problem of the one-way ratchet. Assuming
that newer displays or more recent symbolic expression are, and are
perceived as, a kind of “pushing back” against what some reasonably regard
as an excessive move toward the so-called “naked public square,” it matters
whether the move is correctly so regarded and if so, whether the “pushing
back” might be justified. The “baseline” that the current settlement

19. Id. at 1122.
20. Id. at 1124.
21. Id. at 1115.
22. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), with McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky.,
545 U.S. 844 (2005).
23. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 1123.
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“grandfathers,” in other words, might be more attractive if it really is the
“old 1950s civil religion” than if it is, say, the overly strict separationism of
the 1970s. It could be—to borrow Koppelman’s wonderful metaphor—that
official or public silence about religion is like a “rest in music” that
“highlights the importance of what is not articulated.”24 Sometimes, though,
the silence might be more like the ache and the emptiness left behind when
something valuable has been lost or taken, or when someone loved has
left—like the hole left in the ground when a flowering plant is uprooted and
potted.
Relatedly, Koppelman appears to accept—though, once again, without
great enthusiasm—Justice O’Connor’s “history and ubiquity” excuse for the
words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.25 Like him, I am not “eager
to defend” a “casual identification of God with the nation,”26 but I do not
believe the Pledge necessarily proposes such an identification. As I see it, it
is not that “under God” signifies nothing, or nothing very religious. It is,
instead, that it makes a very important political theology claim—one that is
not only permissible, but indispensable, for the government to make. As
others have put it, the Pledge affirms the “penultimacy” of the state.27 What
is affirmed in the Pledge is not (or need not be) that America is especially
Christian, religious, or virtuous, but instead that America is a country that—
to our credit—asks only limited loyalty from its citizens.28 Our “nation” is
“one,” but it is not everything or the only thing; its claims are relativized,
and put beneath—”under”—something else, something ultimate—”God.” If
this is a “religious truth,”29 then it seems to me that it is one that the
government may and should affirm—one concerning which it need not be

24. Id. at 1137.
25. Id. at 1122.
26. Id.
27. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 925, 951 (2000); Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land
Uses After Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 923 (2000).
28. I owe this insight to Professor Thomas C. Berg. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of
Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41 (2003).
29. As Chad Flanders quite correctly observed to me, in correspondence, claims about the
penultimacy of the state do not have to have a theological cast. My point here is simply that even if
we characterize “under God” in the Pledge as stating a “religious” truth, we can (and, I think,
should) defend its presence in the Pledge on the ground that this particular “religious” truth is one
that even a government like ours may affirm, rather than on the ground that enough time has passed
since its addition to the text.
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“neutral”—and not merely because it has been affirming it long enough to
launder its religious content.30
In addition, I think that Koppelman could say more about judicial
review, and the role of judges in policing and maintaining the features of
“American religious neutrality.” Protecting and respecting the American
ideal, Professor Koppelman argues, requires distinguishing the respective
social meanings of older and newer displays, symbols, enactments, and
proclamations. It requires identifying the “point of view” expressed by a
law, and the purposes served by it, to make sure it is “secular.” We are told
that because governments “may not take a position on religious truth,”
“courts have to assess the plausibility of whatever secular purposes are
proffered by the state.”31 But, putting aside for now doubts we might well
have about the existence of distinctions between law’s “secular,” “moral,”
“religious,” and other purposes,32 it seems at the very least debatable
whether courts, and litigation, over time, are more likely than politically
accountable actors to identify them in a way that serves well the American
ideal. If we think—as both Professor Koppelman and I do—that our
approach to religion and public life questions should be context-sensitive,
then why shouldn’t we say something like: “These questions are hard;
answering them requires balancing and trade-offs; there are many values at
stake, and sometimes in tension, so the best way to answer these questions—
with a few exceptions—is through politics”? To say this is not, of course, to
imagine that there is not a lot at stake, or that the right answers do not matter
(just because they are difficult to find); it is simply to confess that, in this
area, “judicially manageable standards” are hard to come by and so, perhaps,
we should admit what Professor Fallon has called a “permissible disparity
between constitutional ideals and [judicially enforceable] implementing
doctrine.”33

30. Cf. Michael J. Perry, What Do the Free Exercise and Nonestablishment Norms Forbid?
Reflections on the Constitutional Law of Religious Freedom, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 549, 577 (2003);
PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 233–34, 280 (2011)
(characterizing the Pledge as an example of (unconstitutional) “constitutional easements”).
31. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 1136.
32. Cf. Steven D. Smith, The “Secular,” the “Religious,” and the “Moral”: What Are We
Talking About?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487 (2001).
33. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1332 (2006). See generally Richard W. Garnett, Judicial Enforcement of the
Establishment Clause, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 273 (2008). There is, I realize—as Nelson Tebbe
reminded me—some tension between these suggestions, which call for radical changes in the courts’
methods and practices, and my appreciation, expressed above, for “Professor Koppelman’s reminder
that, maybe, things are not so bad[,]” and so I should make it clear here that things could be better.
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III.
Professor Koppelman’s primary thesis is that “American religious
neutrality is coherent and attractive.”34 One question is whether the regime
he describes—a regime that, as I noted above, really is (in some ways)
“coherent and attractive”—is actually “neutral,” or is actually either the
American regime or the “American ideal.” My own impression is that the
coherence and attractiveness of the regime Koppelman proposes and defends
depends substantially on its not being—at least, not entirely—“neutral.”
This regime is one of neutrality “properly understood”35 or, it turns out, of
non-neutrality. The government is not required, by Koppelman’s “proper”
understanding of neutrality, to be religion-blind or indifferent to religion,
and it is certainly not required to be leery of or hostile to it. Instead,
“American religious neutrality” permits governments and officials to regard
religion—at a high level of generality—as a good thing, and to act
accordingly.36 The state is to be “silent about religious truth,”37 but this
silence may be accompanied or complemented by policies—like religionbased accommodations from generally applicable laws—that both reflect
and communicate the view that “religion as such . . . [is] valuable.”38
Maybe one way to put the matter is to say that the American religious
liberty regime aims to be “neutral” with respect to the truth of (most)
religious claims precisely because it is not “neutral”—it does not aim to be
neutral, it should not be neutral—regarding the good of religious freedom.
Religious freedom, in the American tradition, is not what results from the
operationalization in law of hostility towards religion. It is not (only) what
results from a program of conflict-avoidance or division-dampening. It is
not merely the product of those compromises that were necessary to secure
the ratification of the original Constitution. It is, instead, a valuable and
necessary feature of any attractive legal regime because it reflects, promotes,
and helps to constitute human flourishing. So, and again, the state should
remain “neutral” with respect to most religious questions—primarily
because the resolution of such questions is outside the jurisdiction, and not
just the competence, of civil authorities—but it may and should affirm

34.
35.
36.

Koppelman, supra note 4, at 1115.
Id. at 1119.
See John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 275, 283 (1996).
37. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 1137.
38. Id. at 1121.
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enthusiastically that religious freedom is a good thing that should be
protected and nurtured in law and policy.
To flesh out this thought, I will use the Second Vatican Council’s
landmark Dignitatis Humanae: Declaration on Religious Liberty.39 But
first, recall that for centuries, it was widely thought that the “secular”
authority—the civil magistrate—was, as such, charged by God with the cura
religionis, the direct care of true religion itself.40 On this view, it was not the
obligation of a “secular” authority (it would probably be anachronistic to use
the term “state”), because it was secular, to keep itself somehow “separate”
from “religion.”41 It was, instead, the sacred obligation of the political
authority to “defend the faith,” even as it respected the appropriate (but
usually contested) domain and independence of religious authority.42
This way of thinking has, of course, been abandoned in the West,
including in those nations that retain what John Adams might have called
“mild and equitable” religious establishments.43 It has also been abandoned
by most religious communities and authorities, including the one for which,
historically speaking, it was most relevant—the Roman Catholic Church. In
the Declaration, the Council made it clear that the government’s function
with respect to religion is “secular”: its task is not to care directly for the true
religion, but is, instead—in John Courtney Murray’s words— “confined to a
care of the free exercise of religion within society—a care therefore of the
freedom of the Church and of the freedom of the person in religious
affairs.”44 This task is, again, “secular,” because “freedom in society [is] a
secular value—the sort of value that government can protect and foster by
the instrument of law.”45
Accordingly, the Declaration affirms that “constitutional limits should
be set to the powers of government,” so as to protect “the dignity of the
human person” and the “right to religious freedom.”46 Government should
“safeguard . . . the religious freedom of all its citizens . . . by just laws and
other means,” and protect the “equality of citizens before the law”; it should

39. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE [DECLARATION ON
RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY]
(1965)
[hereinafter
DIGNITATIS
HUMANAE],
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_di
gnitatis-humanae_en.html.
40. John Courtney Murray, The Declaration on Religious Freedom, in 15 WAR, POVERTY,
FREEDOM: THE CHRISTIAN RESPONSE 3, 9 (Kevin A. Lynch ed., 1966).
41. Id.
42. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 1135.
43. See John Witte, Jr., “A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of Religion”: John Adams
and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. CHURCH & ST. 213, 214 (1999).
44. Murray, supra note 40, at 9.
45. Id.
46. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 39, ¶¶ 1, 2.
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also “help create conditions favorable to the fostering of religious life”47 and
“take account of the religious life of the citizenry and show it favor.”48
This stance is not “neutral” toward religious freedom, although it is
scrupulously respectful of the human right to freedom in religious matters.
What is envisioned is more, it seems, than Professor Koppelman’s evocative
reference to a “rest in music,” to “silence [that] highlights the importance of
what is not articulated.”49 And yet, it seems to me that the “healthy
secularity” envisioned in the Declaration—one that respects the distinction
between religious and political authority, and the autonomy of the political
sphere, even as it affirms the “religious” truth that all persons are under a
duty, and therefore have the right, to “seek the truth in matters religious”50—
is consistent with the American tradition and ideal, even with the ideal of
“religious neutrality,” properly understood.
How might this work in practice? How might secular, political
authorities “care” for “the freedom of the person” in religious affairs; “create
conditions favorable to the fostering of religious life”; and “take account of
the religious life of the citizenry and show it favor”?51 Is it possible to do so,
consistent with the American ideal of “religious neutrality,” “properly
understood”? Part of the answer is easy: governments “foster[] . . . religious
life”52 by not obstructing or unduly limiting it, and by enforcing
(legislatively, judicially, and in the course of administration and regulation)
the Constitution’s no-establishment rule and antidiscrimination norm. I am
interested, though, in something more. Another part of the answer seems
almost as obvious: governments should broadly and generously
accommodate religiously motivated activity, through exemptions and
otherwise, even when it does not have to. Again, however, I wonder if there
isn’t something more. What other “conditions” are favorable to religious
freedom, and in what other ways (if any) may governments, consistent with
the American idea, “show . . . favor” to “the religious life of the citizenry”?53
Remember, the question is not whether governments like ours are still
charged with the cura religionis—the care of the true religion. They are not.
But they could be—I think they are—charged with the care of religious
freedom. How might they fulfill this charge?
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 3.
Koppelman, supra note 4, at 1137.
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 39, ¶ 3.
Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 6.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 3.
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As I have discussed in more detail elsewhere, governments should
attend to and nurture what Professor Balkin has called, in another context,
the “infrastructure” of religious freedom. He has suggested, with respect to
freedom of speech, that it requires “more than mere absence of government
censorship or prohibition to thrive; [it] also require[s] institutions, practices
and technological structures that foster and promote [it].”54 That is, certain
institutions—newspapers, political parties, interest groups, libraries,
universities and so on—play an important structural, or “infrastructural,”
role in clearing out and protecting the civil-society space within which the
freedom of speech can be well-exercised. The same thing can be said about
religious freedom. Just as “[f]reedom of speech . . . depends on an
infrastructure of free expression,”55 freedom of religion depends on an
infrastructure of, well, religious freedom. Part of this infrastructure—in
addition to its more obvious components, like open and functioning courts,
legal accommodations, thriving communications networks, etc.—is a web of
independent, thriving, distinctive, self-governing (in their appropriate
spheres) institutions. Thus, and for example, the recent Hosanna-Tabor
decision can be seen as a welcome judicial reinforcement of religious
freedom’s infrastructure, of the conditions that are useful, or even necessary,
for its health. It turns out that the political community can protect religious
freedom appropriately only if there are at work in society free associations
and authorities that are not merely political.

54. Jack M. Balkin, The Infrastructure of Religious Freedom, BALKINIZATION (May 5, 2007,
3:15 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/05/infrastructure-of-religious-freedom.html.
55. Jack M. Balkin, Two Ideas for Access to Knowledge—The Infrastructure of Free Expression
and Margins of Appreciation, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 30, 2007, 8:59 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2007/04/two-ideas-for-access-to-knowledge.html.
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